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Emergent	Issues	in	African	Philosophy:	A	Dialogue	with	Kwasi	Wiredu	
(By	Michael	Onyebuchi	Eze	and	Thaddeus	Metz)	
	
	
These	 are	major	 excerpts	 from	 an	 interview	 that	was	 conducted	with	 Professor	
Wiredu	 at	 Rhodes	 University	 during	 the	 13th	 Annual	 Conference	 of	 The	
International	 Society	 for	 African	 Philosophy	 and	 Studies.	 He	 speaks	on	a	wide	
range	of	issues	such	as	political	and	personal	identity,	racism	and	tribalism,	moral	
foundations,	 ity,	 the	 golden	 rule,	 the	 liberal‐communitarian	 debate,	 	 African	
communalism,	 human	 rights,	 personhood,	 consensus,	 meta‐philosophy,	 amongst	
other	critical	themes.		
	
We	are	also	offered	what	may	be	considered	Wiredu’s	definition	of	what	constitutes	
“African	Philosophy”.	For	Wiredu,	African	philosophy	ought	not	necessarily	be	put	
it	in	contrast	to	Western	philosophy.	African	philosophy	must	be	understood	within	
the	context	of	its	emergence	with	its	associative	socio‐cultural	and	political	milieu.	
Philosophy	has	no	borders,	by	which	he	encourages	a	wide‐breadth	of	investigation	
into	different	intellectual	traditions	and	an	openness	to	learn	from	other	traditions.	
He	emphasized	however	that	there	are	basic	human	questions	concerning	a	people	
that	 can	 only	 be	 answered	 by	 embedded	 knowledge	 within	 their	 indigenous	
thought	 systems.	 It	 is	 reductionist	 to	 conceive	 of	 African	 philosophy	 as	 merely	
"ethnophilosophy"	 because	 the	 body	 of	 knowledge	 of	 what	 constitutes	 African	
philosophy	 is	 a	 critical	 n	 investigation	 that	 negotiates	 between	 a	 series	 of	
intellectual	 traditions	 evolving	 from	 Africa,	 including	 those	 discarded	 as	 mere	
myths	 and	 those	 considered	 as	 products	 of	modernity.	 The	 authority	 of	 African	
philosophy	 is	the	ability	to	create	meaning	 for	a	culturally	differentiated	society,;	
meanings	 that	 are	 not	 anachronistic	 but	 relevant	 to	 the	 sociopolitical	 and	
economic	 condition	 of	 the	 people.	 African	 philosophy	 does	 indeed	 have	 critical	
resources	 in	 dealing	with	 the	 challenges	 of	 democratization,	 party	 politics,	 and	
nation	building	in	Africa.			
	
With	 regards	 to	 moral	 judgment,	 his	 Wiredu’s	 leitmotif	 is	 the	 golden	 rule	 ‐	 a	
procedural	 standard	 to	 judge	 what	 action	 is	 right	 or	 wrong	 which	 that	 is	 an	
invitation	 to	 a	 subjective	 empathy.	 Here	 Wiredu	 is	 arguesing	 for	 a	 subjective	
reciprocity	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 norms	 and	 other	 certain	 conventions,	 and	 he	
interestingly	sides	with	Menkiti	in	the	famous	Gyekye	versus	Menkiti	debate.		
	
‐ Eze:	Thank	you	professor	for	this	wonderful	opportunity.	I	begin	by	asking	if	
you	could	state	more	clearly	for	us	your	position	on	the	issues	of	community	
and	 individualism,	 that	 is,	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 primacy	 of	 either	 the	
community	or	individual	in	the	African	thought	system.	Of	course	I	presume	
you	do	not	agree	with	Menkiti’s	radical	communitarianism	…		
‐ Wiredu:	(cuts	in)	Wwhich	scholar	is	that?	No,	it	is	Gyekkye	who	does	not	
agree	with	Menkiti.	I	do	not	believe		that	Menkiti	said	anything	extremely	
radical.	Menkiti’s	position	is	that	to	be	a	person	in	Africa,	you	need	to	not	
just	 be	 born	of	 human	heritage,	 you	need	 also	 to	have	 achieved	 certain	
socio‐ethical	 standards.	 You	 need	 ethical	maturity,	 you	 need	 to	 achieve	
certain	 standard	morally.	 That	 ethical	maturity	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
mores	and	ethics		of	the	society.	Gyekkye	objects	to	this	because	Menkiti	
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seems	to	be	saying	that	the	individual	does	not	have	any	standing	and	this	
leads	to	extreme	communitarianism.	But	 this	 is	absolutely	not	 the	case;,	
Menkiti	didn’t	say	that	the	individual	is	not	appraised	and	is	not	given	any	
room.	 In	 any	 culture,	 you	 are	 going	 to	 have	 concepts	 that	 in	 terms	 of	
which	 you	 appraise	 human	 actions.	 This	 doesn’t	make	 the	 country,	 the	
nation	or	the	culture	authoritarian.	I	mean	what	is	a	bad	person	according	
to	 Menkiti	 in	 African	 culture?	 Right?	 Instead	 of	 saying	 bad	 person	 we	
could	 say	not	 a	person	at	 all.	And	you	are	not	 a	person	 if	 you	have	not	
attained	 certain	moral	 capabilities	 and	 so	on.	Now	 these	criteria	 that	 in	
the	 language	of	 the	given	people	[pause]…	 if	 	you	go	to	Western	culture	
[pause]	get	me	the	most	individualistic	society	in	the	Western	world,	you	
are	still	going	to	have	concepts	of	a	bad	man	and	a	good	man.	When	that	
man	 goes	 about	 stealing	 eggs,	 he	 is	 a	 bad	man	 alright	 and	being	 bad	 is	
defined	by	the	society	only	 in	 the	 indirect	sense	of	being	defined	by	the	
concepts	 that	 are	 used	 in	 a	 given	 language.	 This	 does	 not	make	 you	 an	
extreme	communitarianism	or	anything.	 I	 think	that	criticism	of	Menkiti	
is	just	flat	wrong.		
‐ Eze:	Thank	you!	I	was	just	about	to	quote	you	in	one	of	your	writings	where	
you	 seem	 to	 argue	 that	 “the	 concept	 of	 a	 person	 is	 ‘“social’”	 before	 it	 is	
anything	 else;	 personhood	 is	 not	 an	 automatic	 quality”.	 I	 am	wondering	
about	the	place	of	human	rights	 in	this	context,	or	where	you	would	place	
human	 rights	 in	 this	 African	 intellectual	 context?	What	 about	 individual	
uniqueness?		
‐ Wiredu:	And	what	connection	does	that	have	with	human	rights?	Let’s	say	
that	to	be	a	person	is	not	just	to	be	born	into	the	human	society.	It	doesn’t	
mean	that	you	are	to	be	treated	in	one	way	or	the	other.	You	see	whether	
it	 is	 going	 to	 be	 authoritarian	 or	 not	 is	 going	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 criteria	
themselves,;	that	the	rules	that	are	adopted	in	the	language,	in	the	culture.	
If	 in	 the	 culture	 there	 is	 a	 rule	 that	 anybody	 that	 doesn’t	 belong	 to	 the	
royal	 society	 can	 defect	 anytime,	 that	 is	 what	 makes	 the	 society	
authoritarian.	It	is	the	laws	and	rules	that	are	in	force	in	the	society.	It	is	
not	the	idea	that	in	order	to	be	a	good	person	you	ought	to	have	the	a	b	c	
d	qualifications.		
‐ Eze:	So	in	your	view	personhood	in	this	African	system	of	thinking	 is	not	a	
given	but	acquired?		
‐ Wiredu:	It	is	not	a	given,	you	have	to	acquire	it.		
‐ Metz:	I	think,	may	be,	what	is	going	on	here	is	the	assumption	that	to	be	a	
person	is	equivalent	to	having	a	moral	status,	and	I	take	Professor	Wiredu	
to	 be	 denying	 that.	 you	 could	 still	 have	moral	 status,	 a	moral	 important	
being,	entitled	 to	a	certain	kind	of	 treatment	by	virtue	of	your	actions.	 	 Is	
that	a	fair	assessment?		
‐ Wiredu:	 I	 might	 strengthen	 that	 even	more	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 in	 the	
ontology	of	 a	person,	 here	we	are	describing	 the	 ethical	 concept.	 In	 the	
ontology	of	a	person,	every	person	is	supposed	to	have	a	little	bit	of	divine	
sustenance	 in	 themselves	 that	 is	 what	 gives	 you,	 in	 the	 Akan,	 what	 is	
called	the	“Okra”	which	is	what	gives	you	life.		And,	that	is	supposed	to	be	
something	that	comes	directly	from	God	and	it	is	supposed	to	be	a	speck	
of	divine	sustenance	 itself.	 So,	 if	 you	go	and	kill	 an	 individual,	 you	have	
killed	 em	 …	 a	 being	 that	 has	 that	 sustenance.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 Akan	
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language,	the	word	that	represents	a	person	is	“oOnipa”	and	there	are	two	
meanings	 for	 onipa.	One,	 it	 just	means	 a	 being	 of	 a	 human	 of	 a	 human	
heritage.	 But	 in	 context	 of	 social	 commentary,	 the	 we	 have	 the	 second	
concept	of	a	person,	that	is	the	normative	one.	So	we	have	those	concepts;	
we	have	two	words.	So,	there	is	an	ambiguity;	but	if	you	just	paid	a	little	
attention	 to	 context,	 you	 won’t	 have	 any	 trouble.	 While	 the	 context	 is	
social	 commentary,	 when	 you	 say,	 oh	such	and	such	 is	no	“onipa”	at	all,		
you	are	commenting	on	how	well	or	bad	he	has	been	doing	basically	and	
socially.	Moreover,	very	often,	the	remark	he	has	no	onipa		is	of	regret	and	
not	 criticism.	When	people	begin	 to	 think	 that	you	no	 longer	onipa‐kra,	
they	will	now	stop	moral	criticisms	and	try	to	help	you,	they	will	try	to	get	
help	for	you.	Frequently,	they	will	suspect	that	there	are	some	evil	spirit	
at	 work	 and	 so	 they	 need	 to	 do	 something	 about	 it.	 Bbut	 whatever,	
whether	 that	 is	 valid	 or	 note,	 the	 point	 is	 that	he	is	not	a	person	 	 is	 not	
necessarily	 a	 criticism,	 a	 kind	of	 adverse	 commentary.	 	 It	 can	only	be	 a	
criticism	of	course	that	that	is	where	a	person	starts	going	the	wrong	way.	
Somebody	has	started	drinking	and	he	is	just	drinking	and	people	will	try	
to	 stop	 him	 and	 say	 “look,	 this	 is	 terrible,	 don’t	 do	 it,	 don’t	 do	 it!”	 but	
when	he	has	become	a	complete	addict	they	will	cease	the	criticism	and	
will	try	to	help	and	the	help	is	designed	to	try	to	recover,	to	try	to	regain,	
to	help	him	regain	his	personhood.		
‐ Eze:	I	take	you	back	to	the	issue	of	consensus	in	African	system	of	thoughts.	
You	gave	us	a	motif	of	a	crocodile	two	heads	struggling	for	food.	If	only	they	
know	that	the	food	goes	into	the	same	stomach	they	will	not	struggle	for	it.	
Tthis	 is	how	you	explained	the	process	of	ethical	decision	among	the	Akan	
and	how	they	arrive	at	consensus.	But	don’t	you	think	that	consensus	does	
not	 accommodate	 every	 particular	 viewpoint?.	 In	 this	 sense,	 consensus	 is	
somewhat	likened	to	a	totalitarian	unanimity,	and	I	am	wondering	whether	
you	would	rather	substitute	 the	crocodile	example	with	a	kind	of	a	realist	
perspectivism	 when	 you	 consider	 for	 example	 Lyotard’s	 critique	 of	
Habermesian	consensus.	 	Or,	would	your	use	of	consensus	be	any	different	
from	that	of	Habermas?	If	not,	don’t	you	think	that	this	Kantian	foundation	
and	orientation	 stifles	 individual	 liberty	 to	 some	extent?	But	 if	you	agree,	
could	you	explain	further?			
‐ Wiredu:	 I	 speak	 of	 decisional	 consensus.	 Consensus	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
wthat	to	do.	 It	 is	 important	 to	distinguish	between	decisional	consensus	
and	 cognitive	 consensus.	 When	 people	 are	 debating	 issues	 in	 the	
parliament	and	so	on,	there	are	two	issues,	example,		is	the	issue	of	what	
are	 the	 consequences	 of	 that	 decision	 going	 to	 be	 and	 so	 on.	 These	 are	
cognitive	questions.	Tthere	will	 be	differences	of	what	 the	properties	of	
the	thing	in	question	are.	Ok,	this	is	one	type	of	question.	But	we	can	also	
discuss	the	question	of	what	to	do	in	advance.	A	consensus	society	is	one	
in	 which	 people	 can	 argue	 agree	 about	 what	 to	 doe	 even	 though	 they	
disagree	 on	 some	 issues	 about	 what	 ought	 to	 be	 done	 or	 what	 can	 be	
done.	 So	 the	 question	 of	 consensus	 should	 not	 be	 identified	 with	
unanimity.	 There	 is	 going	 to	 be	 unanimity	 only	 regarding	what	 is	 to	 be	
done,	 not	 unanimity	 regarding	what	 ought	 to	 be	 done.	 Now,	 unanimity	
regarding	what	is	 to	be	done	is	obviously	not	an	easy	thing	to	achieve.	 I	
think	that	in	a	society,	in	order	to	gain	something	like	that,	it	is	going	to	be	
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shown	 that	 serious	 attention	 will	 be	 given;	 serious	 and	 respectful	
attention	will	 be	given	 to	 all	 those	who	hold	opinions	 that	 are	 at	 stake,	
that	 are	 concerned	 in	 the	 discussion.	 People	 need	 to	 be	 practicing	 that.	
Now,	 in	 some	 of	 the	 things	 I	 have	 written	 about	 consensus,	 I	 have	
suggested	 that	 at	 least	 in	 some	 African	 countries,	 there	 is	 a	 history	 of	
consensus,	 the	operation	 of	 consensus	 in	 decision‐	making.	 I	 know	 that	
these	 societies	 are	 supposed	 to	 have	 been	 simple	 societies,	 and	 so	
consensus	 may	 have	 been	 easy	 for	 society	 of	 that	 kind	 but	 not	 in	
contemporary	 societies.	 I	 have	 heard	 that	 criticism.	 That	 criticism	 does	
not	 impress	me	overmuch	 	much,	but	 at	 least	 it	 grasps	 the	point	 one	 is	
making	 that	 in	 traditional	 societies	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 people	 to	 take	
decisions	about	what	is	to	be	done,	take	that	decision	unanimously.	Now,	
people	were	ready	to	accede	to	certain	decisions	even	if	they	seem	to	be	
based	on	cognitive	assumptions	which	they	did	not	agree	with.	The	hope	
was	that	perhaps	the	time	will	come	when	they	will	also	be	in	situations	
whence	they	are	not	the	ones	making	the	concessions	but	others	are.	As	
for	 the	complexity	of	modern	society,	 that	 is	 true,	but	you	know	people	
even	 in	 the	 simplest	 societies,	 people	 can	 get	 into	 disagreement	 upon	
matters	 about	 which	 they	 feel	 strongly.	 The	 difference	 is	 going	 to	 be	
whether	we	have	had	a	practice	in	consensus	decision‐	making.		
‐ Eze:	You	have	written	a	lot	and	has	influenced	many	African	thinkers.	Many	
young	African	scholars	look	up	to	you	for	direction	in	some	areas.	I	am	just	
wondering	what	critical	resources	do	you	think	or	suggest	that	we	one	can	
draw	 from	 African	 philosophy	 and	 African	 ethics	 for	 contemporary	
multicultural	society	including	politics.	What	can	African	philosophy	do	for	
multiculturalism?	 A	 country	 like	 Nigeria	 for	 example	 has	 over	 three	
hundred	 languages	and	ethnicities.	What	 intellectual	capital	can	we	draw	
from	African	philosophy	in	terms	of	multiculturalism?				
‐ Wiredu:	Wwell,	 to	 just	 connect	with	what	we	 just	 said,	 I	 think	 that	 our	
politics	 which	 we	 have	 now	 are	 based	 on	 foreign	 models;,	 they	 don’t	
encourage	unity,	 they	don’t.	Many	African	countries	are	made	up	of	one	
large	ethnic	group		and	a	number	of	smaller	groups.	In	Ghana	the	Akan’s	
constitutes	almost	half	of	the	population	and	then	you	have	other	groups.	
We	have	at	 least	46	languages.	Now,	if	you	adopt	a	majoritarian	system,	
then	one	tribe	is	going	to	be	in	power	all	the	time	–	one	tribe	or	one	ethnic	
group.	In	this	case,	the	Akans	are	going	to	be	in	power	because	they	are	
the	majority	and	 the	other	groups	are	not	going	to	be	happy	about	 this.	
This	 has	 happened	 in	 many	 African	 countries.	 You	 can’t	 get	 people	 to	
adhere	to	a	setting	of	that	kind	with	constant	happiness	when	they	know	
that	 they	 are	 always	 in	 the	 minority.	 And	 the	 thing	 that	 makes	 it	 so	
seriously	is	that,	remember	that	these	countries	like	Ghana,	et	cetera	are	
artificial	entities	 that	 the	colonialists	put	 together.	So,	people	do	have,	 if	
not	necessarily	very	conscious	sense,	they	have	somehow	a	subconscious	
sense	of	 identity	which	 is	 prior	 to	 the	 sense	of	 that	national	 identity	 as	
that	of	the	whole	of	Ghana	or	whole	of	Nigeria.	So	if	 	we	are	operating	a	
majoritarian	 system,	you	 are	 going	 to	 inflame	 this	possibility	of	what	 is	
called	 “tribalism”.	Tribalism	would	cause	one	group	killing	 thousands	of	
thousands	of	other	group.	I	think	that	the	majoritarian	system	in	Africa	is	
a	disaster;	it	is	going	to	be	a	disaster.	Eeven	when	they	have	not	resulted	
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to	 in	killing	people,	 it	 is	nasty	enough.	Go	 to	Ghana,	Ghanaians	are	very	
peaceful	 people,	 but	 go	 to	 Ghana	 and	 see	 the	 kind	 of	 opposition	 that	 is	
there.	Well,	 I	 am	 not	 speaking	 against	 the	 “opposition”	 as	 such	 but	 the	
kind	of	relationship	that	exists	between	what	is	called	the	opposition	and	
what	is	called	government.	So,	can’t	they	think	of	a	better	system?	Where	
perhaps	they	cannot	now	because	they	are	under	constraints	from	foreign	
powers.	When	 African	military	men	 completed	 the	 destruction	 of	 their	
economies	then	they	hadve	to	appeal	to	Western	powers,	and	they	said	,	
“Ook,	we	can	give	you	some	money	but	you	have	to	adopt	this	method”.	A	,	
a	method	 that	 they	 think	works	well	 for	 them,	 though	 I	marvel	 at	why	
they	 cannot	 think	of	 a	 better	 system	 than	 the	one	 I	 can	 see	 in	 the	USA.	
They	are	imposing	that	on	their	people	and	many	of	them	are	convinced	
or	go	by	it,	but	 it	 is	nasty	the	way	it	operates.	…It	seems	to	me	that	that	
kind	of	method	of	government	is	a	disaster	and	it	is	going	to	be	a	disaster.		
I	 think	 we	 should	 try	 hard	 to	 discover	 the	 form	 of	 democracy	 that	 is	
suited	to	our	situation	in	Africa	with		careful	study	of	our	traditions		and	a	
careful	 application	 of	 common	 sense	 and	 logic.	 The	present	 situation	 is	
that	we	in	Africa	are	being	forced	to	operate	a	certain	kind	of	democracy,	
that	 is	party	democracy.	This	came	about	 in	the	following	way:	we	have	
had	many	coups	 in	Africa.	 	 These	military	 leaders	would	 regard	African	
economies	as	booty	and	destroyed	 the	economies	 completely	with	 their	
civilian	friends.	So	they	needed	help	to	revive	the	economy	and	they	will	
then	go	to	the	world	bank,	IMF	and	organizations	like	that.	And	they	said	
ok,	nice,	we	are	prepared	to	give	you	some	money	but	you	have	to	do	a	b	c	
d	 and	 this	 included	 party	 politics	 and	 abolition	 of	 spending	 on	 social	
services.	 …	Multiparty	 democracy	may	 be	 good	 for	 some	 countries	 but	
perhaps	they	are	not	good	for	all	countries.	They	It	may	not	be	good	for	
countries	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 small	 and	 large	 ethnic	 groups.	 When	 this	
happens,	the	majoritarian	system	will	enable	the	dominant	ethnic	group	
to	be	 in	power	all	 the	 time	and	other	ethnic	groups	being	peripheral	 to	
power,	and	they	get	disaffected	and,	 if	 they	have	a	Captain	or	a	Colonel,	
one	morning	they	take	over.	This	has	been	happening.	We	need	a	form	of	
democracy	 that	 corresponds	 in	 some	way	 to	our	own	 culture.	 That	 is	 a	
question	 that	 is	 not	 discussed,	 yet	 it	 is	 a	 question	 African	 philosopher	
ought	to	discuss	and	ought	to	try	to	do	something	about.		
‐ 	
‐ But	 you	 asked	me	what	 can	African	derive	 from	 their	 tradition?	 I	 think	
they	can	derive	some	very	important	things.	In	African	tradition,	I	do	not	
know	of	any	African	group	who	are	proselytizers,	who	go	about	trying	to	
get	people	out	of	 darkness;,	 “these	people	are	in	darkness	and	we	need	to	
bring	them	 light”.	I	 have	 never	 heard	 of	 it.	 	 And,	 definitely,	 Akans	 don’t	
have	 it.	 We	 say	 in	 Akan,	 nobody	 teaches	 a	 child	 God.	 But	 we	 do	 have	
skeptics	in	our	tradition,	people	who	don’t	believe	in	God,	in	spirits	and	so	
on.	 But	 it	 is	 your	 own	 businesses.	 Nobody	 is	 going	 to	 persecute	 you	
because	you	don’t	believe	in	so	and	so	metaphysical	concept	of	the	world.	
If	you	don’t	believe,	it	is	almost	unintelligible	for	an	Akan	to	go	about	and	
say,	you	must	believe	as	I	believe.	Now,	I	think	this	is	not	only	good	for	the	
nation	but	for	the	whole	world	that	what	you	believe	in	metaphysics,	in	a	
religion	and	so	on	is	your	own	business.	Too,	you	don’t	go	about	trying	to	
	 6
get	people	by	all	means	to		believe	in	your	“belief”.	This	is	what	is	going	on	
right	now	in	the	world,	the	people	who	want	the	whole	world	to	believe	
what	they	believe.	When	you	have	people	in	opposing	camps	believing	the	
same	 kind	 of	 thing	 and	 wanting	 the	 whole	 world	 to	 believe	 what	 they	
believe,	they	will	fight,	which	also	you	can	see	if	you	just	look.	I	think	this	
is	one	positive	thing	about	Africa.	I	will	write	more	on	that,;	on	morality	
and	religion.	Whereas	 in	the	orthodox	books,	you	find	 it	said	that	Africa	
morality	is	based	on	religion.	All	that	is	very	deeply	mistaken	and	I	think	
it	 ought	 to	 be	 brought	 out	 and	 explained	 that	 one	 thing	 about	 African	
society	 is	 that	 morality	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 anything	 supernatural.	
Moreover,	the	concept	of	supernatural	 itself	does	not	make	sense	in	any	
African	worldview	 that	 I	 have	 knowledge	 of.	 Certainly	 not	 in	 the	 Akan	
worldview.	These	are	things	that	perhaps	if	the	time	comes,	when	people	
can	look	at	African	philosophy	seriously	then	perhaps	when	they	look	at	
it,	 they	will	 see	 that	 these	 are	 lessons	 they	 can	 learn.	 I	 think	 that	 now,	
many	places	in	the	USA	and	in	Europe,	people	are	now	paying	attention	to	
African	 Philosophy	 and	 that	 is	 fine.	 But	 I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 we	 have	
reached	a	stage	where	somebody	will	look	at	African	philosophy	and	say	
let’s	 see	 if	we	can	 learn	something	 from	 it.	The	 idea	 is,	 “Oh	ok,	 so	 these	
people	have	these	ideas	and	so	on”.?	That	is	it.	Wwe	have	not	reached	that	
stage.	When	I	read	Western	Philosophy,	I	also	read	to	see	what	I	can	get	
from	it.	Can	I	get	something	from	it?	I	think	I	get	a	lot	from	philosophers	
like	 John	 Dewey.	 He	 is	 extremely	 wise	 and	 not	 a	 great	 stylist	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 his	 technical	writing,	 but	 actually	 he	 can	write	 nicely	when	 it	
comes	to	social	commentary	and	things	like	that.	I	read	Dewey;	I	can	get	
stuff	from	Dewey.	When	I	read	any	philosophy	like	that,		I	read	it	for	what	
I	 can	 get.	 I	 may	 learn	 something	 from	 it.	 I	 don’t	 know	 that	 too	 many	
people	 approach	 African	 philosophy	 from	 that	 standpoint	 for	 perhaps	
they	can	 learn	something	from	it.	But	when	the	time	comes,	 that	will	be	
one	 thing	 they	will	 learn,	one	of	 the	 things	 they	will	 learn	 from	African	
philosophy	 because	 up	 till	 now,	 I	 would	 say	 that	 the	 orthodox	 belief	
among	 Christians	 is	 that	 morality	 is	 the	 command	 of	 God.	 That	 is	
essentially	an	infantile	kind	of	outlook	on	morality.		
‐ 	
‐ A	time	will	come	when	perhaps	people	will	note	that	from	Africa,	you	can	
learn	 something	about	morality	 and	 this	 is	 extremely	 important.	 	 There	
are	very	strong	features	of	our	cultures	that	we	can	bring	out	clearly	from	
which	 other	 people	 can	 learn.	 I	 believe	 that	 our	 cultures	 are	 extremely	
open‐minded	about	things	like	belief.	African	people	don’t	go	about	trying	
to	 breing	 people	 to	 light.	 We	 don’t	 suppose	 that	 other	 people	 are	 in	
darkness	where	we	are	to	give	them	light.	Metaphysics	and	belief	in	God	
and	stuff	like	that,	these	are	left	to	individuals.	The	claim	that	Africans	are	
religious,	that	everything	is	religious	about	Africa,	that	is	a	misjudgment.	
Africans	are	very	relaxed	about	big	metaphysical	beliefs	like	creation	our	
of	 the	 world;	 creationor	 of	 the	 world	 out	 of	 nothing.	 Indeed	 I	 doubt	
whether	such	concepts	are	expressible	in	Africa.	That	attitude	is	personal.	
As	mentioned,	we	say	in	Akan,	you	don’t	teach	a	child	God,	which	suggests	
that	 anybody	who	 can	 think	 can	 figure	 those	 things	 out	 for	 themselves.	
But	 if	 one	doesn’t	 believef,	 it	 is	his	own	business.	This	 is	 something	we	
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can	teach	the	world	 	because	lots	of	people,	persons	and	nations	believe	
that	 their	metaphysics	 should	 be	 accepted	 by	 all.	 And	 they	 believe	 that	
they	 have	 revelations.	 Revelations	 in	 any	 African	 system	 that	 I	 know	
about,	 if	 there	 is	 any	 sort	 of	 revelation,	 it	 is	 a	 very	 limited	 kind	 of	
empirical	revelation.	Let’s	say	that	that	there	is	a	spirit	and	someone	has	
lost	some	eggs	and	the	spirit	reveals	that	this	one	stole	it	rather	than	that	
one.	We	have	many	such	spirits	like	that	and	it	can	be	refuted.	There	are	
times	 they	 can	be	 refuted	 and	 if	 the	 god	 is	 constantly	 refuted,	 it	 can	be	
killed.	 	 Just	by	averting	your	attention	from	it	and	by	scorning	it,	 it	dies.	
Talking	about	such	revelation,				one	in	which	God	told	you	last	night	and	
so	 on,	 	 we	 don’t	 have	 something	 like	 that.	 This	 is	 extremely	 important	
because	it	seems	to	me	that	a	lot	of	conflict	today	in	the	world	is	due	to	
the	fact	that	some	people	have	revelation	from	God	apparently	and	other	
have	 opposite	 revelation,	 they	 can	only	 fight.	 I	 think	Africans	 can	 teach	
the	world	stuff	like	that.		
‐ Metz:	I	wonder	when	that	will	ever	happen	because	I	have	the	same	feeling	
that	Indian	philosophy	has	a	 long	history	and	I	still	think	that	 in	the	West	
people	don’t	 take	 the	attitude	 that	 you	 take	 to	Western	philosophy.	Even	
though	it	has	a	long	tradition,	for	most	part	Western	academics	don’t	read	
non‐Western	philosophy	to	see	what	they	can	get	out	of	it.		
‐ Wiredu:	Yyea,	that	is	very	true.	However	people	like	the	Indians	are	in	a	
stronger	 position	 than	 African	 because	 a	 long	 time	 ago,	 the	 West	 did	
recognize	 that	 they	do	have	a	 tradition	of	philosophy,	a	 long	 traditional	
philosophy	 and	 there	 are	many	 specialists,	many	Western	 scholars	 that	
are	 specialists	 in	 Eastern	 philosophy.	 Even	 so	 you	 are	 right.	 Indian	
philosophy	or	Chinese	philosophy	is	not	something	that	Western	students	
takes	for	what	they	can	learn	from	it.	It	is	a	kind	of	touristic	spirit.	Oh	this	
people	have	got	it!	That	is	it.				
‐ Eze:	Don’t	 you	 think	 that	 this	kind	of	attitude	 to	non‐Western	philosophy	
has	 to	 do	 with	 postcolonial	 discourse,;	 the	 whole	 orientation	 towards	
Africa?	 And	 why	 do	 you	 interrogate	 the	 reason	 of	 such	 discourse,	
considering	 people	 like	 Kant,	Hegel	 and	Hume	who	were	 all	 sons	 of	 the	
Enlightenment	with	its	celebration	of	rationality	as	core	of	humanity,	but	a	
virtue	 not	 extended	 to	 the	 Africans	 whom	 they	 disqualified	 as	 humans	
worthy	of	any	rational	capacity?.			
‐ Wiredu:	 It	 is	not	postcolonial,	 it	 is	colonial.	You	mentioned	Hume	and	so	
on.	It	is	something	that	is	going	on	for	a	long	time.	It	is	not	something	that	
happened	after	colonialism.	It	is	not	colonialism	in	that	sense.		It	is	racism	
that	has	been	in	the	tradition	for	a	long	time.	One	surprising	thing	is	that	
while	chaps	like	Hegel	and	so	on	were	saying	nonsense	about	Africa,	there	
were	 people	 there,	 Western	 philosophers,	 who	 knew	 that	 it	 was	
nonsense.	 There	were	 lesser,	weaker	 philosophers	 in	 Britain	who	were	
trying	to	dissuade		Hume	form	from	his	nonsense.	So	it	is	a	very	pressing	
kind	 of	 thing	 in	 the	 history	 of	Western	 philosophy.	When	 you	 say	 it	 is	
postcolonial,	 it	 was	 there	 before	 colonization,	 it	 was	 there	 during	
colonization	and	it	is	there	now.	Through	one	begins	to	see	the	possibility	
that	 it	will	change.	Definitely	there	have	been	changes,	so	now	you	have	
African	 Philosophy	 departments	 in	 many	 American	 uUniversities,	
something	you	didn’t	have	a	few	years	ago.		
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‐ Eze:	As	an	African	student	studying	in	Europe,	sometimes	I	have	a	problem	
with	 identity.	 I	 have	 some	 crises	 especially	 when	 I	 am	 encountering	 an	
“other”	European	who	simply	sees	me	as	African.	I	ask	myself,	who	am	I?	Am	
I	a	Nigerian?	An	African?	An	Igbo?	An	Opi‐Nsukka	person?	What	constitutes	
my	identity	as	an	African?	The	inference	from	our	conversation	so	far	brings	
to	my	mind,	Benedict	Anderson’s	“imagined	community”,	and	I	wonder	how	
this	 is	 applicable	 in	 to	 understanding	 African	 identity,	 considering	 the	
fractured	 imaginaries	 of	 African	 cultural	 identities,	 identity	 Balkanized	
with	colonization.	 	Do	you	have	 that	kind	of	experience	when	you	have	 to	
struggle	with	your	 identity?	Ffor	example,	you	 see	a	 fellow	Ghanaian	and	
you	 are	 sitting	 and	 chatting	 and	 then	 somebody	 from	 your	Akan	 culture	
comes,	whom	do	you	owe	your	obligation?	Do	you	have	an	attachment	 to	
your	 tradition?	 To	 your	 Akan	 cultural	 heritage	 first	 before	 being	 a	
Ghanaian	or	a	black	person	in	Africa?		
‐ Wiredu:	I	think	this	is	the	most	difficult	question	that	you	have	asked	this	
afternoon.	 It	depends	on	all	kinds	of	 situations.	Suppose	 I	 am	 talking	 to	
my	 best	 friend	 who	 is	 a	 Ghanaian	 and	 who	 belongs	 to	 another	 ethnic	
group	and	somebody	form	my	ethnic	groups	comes:	it	does	not	create	any	
new	tension.	Yes,	this	man	is	my	best	friend	but	it	doesn’t	mean	that	one	
from	my	ethnic	 group	 is	 going	 to	be	my	best	 friend.	That	 could	happen	
with	some	African	countries.	In	some	African	countries,	tribalism	is	very	
strong,	which	 is	not	 the	case	 in	Ghana.	 It	 is	 there,	we	do	have	a	 certain	
amount	 of	 tribalism	 in	 Ghana,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 as	 great	 as	 that.	 So	 it	won’t	
make	much	difference	as	in	the	situation	you	imagined.	I	don’t	think	so.		
‐ Metz:	 I	 would	 like	 to	 talk	 about	 some	 of	 your	 ethical	 and	 political	
philosophy.	I	find	a	tension	between	two	of	the	chapters	in	one	of	your	books	
(Cultural	Universals	and	Particulars—eds.).	One	chapter	suggests	 that	 the	
end	of	all	moral	action	 is	to	promote	the	well	being	of	 individual.	But	 in	a	
later	 chapter,	when	 you	 defend	 the	 idea	 of	 non‐party	 politics,	 you	 don’t	
appeal	 to	 that	 idea,	 you	 appeal	 to	 two	 other	 ideas:	 one,	 about	 right	 to	
representation	 and	 another	 about	 promotion	 of	 harmony.	 And	 I	wonder	
whether	there	is	a	tension	between	these	two	chapters.	You	will	thatwould	
think	 that	 if	 you	were	 going	 to	 justify	 non‐party	 politics,	 you	will	would	
have	appealed	to	moral	principles	articulated	earlier,	which	was	a	matter	
of	 improving	people’s	quality	of	 life.	 I	 find	 it	 interesting	 that	you	don’t	do	
that.	Can	you	shed	more	light	on	that?		
‐ Wiredu:	The	pPursuit	of	human	well‐	being,	 actually,	 is	not	moral	at	 all.	
What	 is	 moral	 is	 the	 even‐handed	 pursuit	 of	 human	 interest.	 Human	
interest	 based	 on	 some	 principles	 which	 that	 enables	 us	 to	 take	 the	
interests	of	all	in	the	given	group	into	account.	I	suggested	elsewhere	that		
that	this	principle		is	the	golden	rule.	It	is	the	golden	rule	that	gives	us	the	
basis	for	equalization,	to	consider	every	person	as	one.	When	it	comes	to	
politics,	I	believe	that	the	right	to	representation		is	a	moral	right.	If	based	
on	the	principle	of	human	well‐being,	we	take	everyone	as	able,	first	of	all,	
to	have	a	confession	of	their	own	interest	and	then	we	try	to	harmonize	
these	 interests	 with	 a	 principle	 which	 in	 the	 Western	 or	 Christian	
language	has	been	called	thea	“golden	rule”.	I	don’t	quite	feel	any	sort	of	
tension	between	the	situations.		
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‐ Metz:	So,	 that	brings	 together	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	 fundamental	moral	
obligation	is	to	promote	well‐being	in	an	impartial	way	and	you	say	out	of	
that	follows	a	further	right.?	On	representation,	can	you	shed	more	light	on	
where	harmony	 fits	 into	 that?	 Is	 it	also	derived	 from	a	more	 fundamental	
obligation	 to	promote	 interests	 in	an	 impartial	way	or	 is	rather	harmony	
the	foundation?		
‐ Wiredu:	Iit	is	another	way	of	referring	to	even‐handedness.	The	harmony	
is	promotion	of	human	interest	according	to	a	principle	that	universalizes,	
which	makes	everyone	count	at	once.		
‐ Metz:	A	 follow	up,	bBut	that	sounds	utilitarian,	and	I	wonder	whether	you	
are	 happy	 with	 characterizing	 African	 ethics	 in	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 “everybody	
counts	for	one”.	Everybody’s	interests	matter	and	we	sum	up	the	total	well‐
being	 and	 do	 whatever	 action	 is	 going	 to	 promote	 that.	 Is	 that	 a	 fair	
reflection	of	your	judgment	of	African	ethics?		
‐ Wiredu:	 No,	 this	 is	 extremely	 interesting.	 	 J.	 S.	Mill,	 who	 is	 best	 known	
traditionally	for	utilitarianism,	I	think	is	rather	careless	in	formulating	his	
theory.	Usually	when	he	wanted	to	give	a	short	statement	of	his	theory,	he	
would	 say	 according	 to	 his	 utilitarian	 principles,	 an	 action	 is	 good	 if	 it	
promotes	the	greatest	happiness	of	the	greatest	number	of	people.	That	is	
a	very	absurd	principle.		When	he	is	pressed,	however,	he	would	say	that	
“my	principle	is	no	different	from	the	principle	of	the	son	of	man”,	which	
is	reference	to	the	golden	rule.	So,	when	he	is	pressed,	he	appeals	to	the	
golden	 rule.	 So	 	 	 I	 think	 that	 it	 is	 the	presence	of	 the	golden	rule	 in	 the	
system	that	makes	it	moral	at	all.	So			Iif	utilitarianism	is	the	concept	that	
Mill	gave	carelessly	by	appealing	to	the	happiness	of	the	greatest	number,	
then	 that	 is	quiet	 	 quite	useless.	 I	 am	not	 a	utilitarian,	 and	 I	don’t	 think	
that	my	people	in	Ghana	or	in	Africa	are	utilitarian,	but	I	think	that	given	
that	the	golden	rule	is	accorded	its	place	than	there	frequently,		we	have	
to,	 in	 addition	 to	 that,	 appeal	 to	 some	 principle	 or	 of	 the	 greatest	
happiness.		
‐ Metz:	Now,	 I	 am	 skeptical	 about	 the	 golden	 rule.	 I	 had	 never	 thought	 of	
African	ethics	as	being	able	to	be	captured	primarily	by	that	principle.	I	am	
wondering	whether	you	are	happy	with	some	of	the	apparent	 implications	
of	that	principle.	So	you	might	say	that	one	 implication	is	that	 it	 is	always	
wrong	to	punish	people.	If	you	want	people	to	treat	you	as	you	want	to	be	
treated,	 virtually	 no	 one	 wants	 to	 be	 punished.	 I	 wonder	 whether	 even	
though,	cClearly	there	is	a	strong	strain	in	African	thinking	that	the	point	of	
criminal	justice	should	be	some	kind	of	reconciliation	between	the	offender	
and	 the	 community	 or	 the	 ancestors.	More	 broadly	 speakingHowever,,	 I	
wonder	whether	that	 it	goes	too	 far	to	suggest	that	punishment	as	such	 is	
incompatible	with	that	approach.		
‐ Wiredu:	Tthe	golden	rule	sounds	very	simple.	It	isn’t	at	all.	It	often	raises	
questions	of	 interpretations.	Your	reference	to	punishment	 just	reminds	
me	of	a	teacher	I	had	who	was	extremely	opposed	to	Kant.	And	one	way	in	
which	he	used	to	ridicule	Kant	was	the	categorical	imperative.	He	would	
say,	the	world	is	going	to	be	hot	crazye	indeed	if	in	order	to	kiss	my	wife	I	
had	to	agree	that	everybody	can	kiss	her.	You	can	see	the	problem	here	in	
interpretation.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 punishment,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 problem	 of	
interpretation,	and	I	think	like	others	who	are	in	trouble	to	be	punished,	
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but	 I	don’t	wouldn’t	 like	myself	 to	be	punished	…	 	We	need	 to	state	 the	
principle	 fairly	 clearly	 before	 we	 can	 see	 if	 it	 makes	 sense	 within	 the	
context	 of	 the	 golden	 rule.	 It	 does	 not	 occur	 to	me	 easily	 how	 one	 can	
formulate	within	 this	 slight	 degree	 of	 precision	 a	 rule	 that	 permits	 any	
human	being	to	be	in	favor	of	punishment	when	it	is	the	other	people	that	
are	being	punished	and	against	it	when	that	person	himself	is	going	to	be	
punished.		
‐ Metz:	That	sounds	right	but	the	worry	is	that	that	the	golden	rule	commits		
you	 to	 thinking	 that	 no	 punishment	 is	 justified	 for	 anyone	 because	 no	
individual	himself	wants	to	be	punished.	And	the	ground	of	how	you	should	
treat	others	according	to	the	golden	rule	is	what	you	yourself	would	want,	
or	do	you	have	a	different	understanding	of	the	golden	rule?		
‐ Wiredu:	Yes.	What	you	want	is	an	exact	reversal	of	situation.	Golden	rule	
is	an	exact	reversal.	Suppose	you	are	going	to	do	something	that	is	going	
to	 affect	 other	 people,	 reverse	 the	 situation,	 and	 put	 yourself	 in	 the	
situation	 of	 the	 person	 who	 was	 originally	 going	 to	 suffer	 and	 the	
consequences	of	 your	 action.	 In	 that	 situation	 let	 us	 know	whether	 you	
approve	it	or	not.		
‐ Metz:	By	that	token,	suppose	we	have	a	rapist	and	I	am	the	judge,	and	I	am	
going	to	apply	the	golden	rule.	I	am	asking	myself	whether	I	can	mete	out	
any	punishment	and	how	severe	the	punishment	can	be.	I	put	myself	in	the	
rapist’s	position	and	I	am	thinking	if	I’d	rather	be	punished	at	all.	Am	I	not	
committed	as	a	judge	to	acquit	him?		
‐ Wiredu:	Again,	it	is	a	problem	of	interpretation,	which	I	think	can	even	be	
made	 clear.	 Even	 more	 dramatic	 is	 to	 take	 the	 case	 of	 a	 child.	 The	
principle	 is	not	to	put	yourself	 in	the	position	of	a	child	and	think	 like	a	
child.	No,	put	yourself	in	a	position	and	think	as	you	are	able	to	think	now	
and	 judge	 whether	 you	 will	 like	 it.	 Iif	 the	 position	 or	 idea	 was	 to	 put	
yourself	in	the	position	of	a	child	and	judge	like	a	child,	then	you	get	into	
that	 kind	 of	 situation.	 But	 put	 yourself	 there	 and	 judge	 like	 a	 mature	
person.	I	thin	that	is	what	the	principle	requires.		
‐ Metz:	Now	I	am	worried	that	when	we	start	bringing	in	issues	of	judgment	
or	 	 judging	 reasonably,	 what	 we	 are	 implicitly	 doing	 is	 smuggling	 in	
another	moral	principle.		
‐ Wiredu:	 No,	 I	wonder,	 unless	we	 could	 bring	 in	 the	 ideas	 like	 to	 “judge	
maturely”	 we	 could	 not	 even	 think	 of	 principles.	 How	 can	 you	 state	 a	
principle	 governing	 human	 behavior	 if	 we	 cannot	 assume	 that	 the	
subjects	 are	 reasonable	or	being	 reasonable	 in	a	 general	 sense	of	being	
rational?		Then	I	will	agree	with	you	that	we	cannot	have	a	principle	like	
the	golden	rule,	but	we	cannot	have	any	principle	whatever.	I	cannot	see	
any	prospect	of	any	moral	principle	in	that	situation.		
‐ Metz:	Wwell,	we	need	to	suppose	that	people	are	acting	for	reasons	and	are	
responsive	 to	 reasons,	 but	 I	 take	 the	 job	 of	a	moral	 theory	 to	give	us	an	
account	of	what	the	good	moral	reasons		are,	and	one	way	of	summing	them	
up	is	the	golden	rule	or	is	supposed	to	be.	But	now	the	golden	rule	says	treat	
others	 as	 you	will	would	 like	 to	 have	 them	 treat	 you	 insofar	 as	 you	 are	
reasonable	or	mature.	That	 is	awfully	 close	 to	 saying	 treat	others	as	 you	
would	want	to	be	treated	insofar	as	you	are	morally	upright.	In	which	case	
we	nee	d	 to	ot	get	 some	other	moral	account	of	what	 it	 is	 that	 is	morally	
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upright	or	virtuous.	And	the	golden	rule	 is	supposed	to	provide	that	on	 its	
own.		
‐ Wiredu:	But	I	think	that	you	are	conflating	rationality,	say,	something	like	
cognitive	 rationality	 with	 moral	 rationality.	 Ift	 we	 do	 that,	 we	 cannot	
define	any	moral	concept	idea.	We	have	to	assume	that	we	do	have	sort	of	
general	intelligence	and	rationality.		
‐ Metz:	 Let	 me	 switch	 gears	 a	 little	 bit	 to	 illustrate	 some	 point	 though		
because	I	am	also	curious	about	how	to	get	from	the	golden	rule	to	the	right	
to	representation	that	grounds	on	non‐party	politics.	So	if	I	start	with	eh	the	
principle	 that	 I	am	 to	 treat	 others	as	 I	would	 like	 to	 be	 treated,	 at	 least	
insofar	as	I	am	mature,	there	is	some	gap	between	that	and	the	claim	that	I	
would	necessarily	want	to	a	say	in	every	decision	that	a	legislature	makes.	
Why	 think	 that	 follows,	 as	 opposed	 to	 having	 an	 equal	 opportunity	 to	
influence	the	parliamentary	decisions	and	debates?		
‐ Wiredu:	Wwell,	suppose	I	think	that	I	would	like	my	voice	to	be	taken	into	
account	in	any	decision	that	affects	me.	Anybody	that	is	going	to	deny	this	
is	going	to	have	to	face	a	question	of	whether	they	would	be	happy	to	be	
in	a	 situation	where	decisions	are	 taken	 that	 affects	 them	without	 their	
interest	being	taken	into	account.		
‐ Metz:	Aand	I	might	say	again,	yes	I	will	would	be	willing	to	give	up	my	voice	
to	be	heard	in	the	case	of	every	single	policy	that	the	government	makes.	So	
long	as	 I	have	an	equal	opportunity	 in	 influencing	decision	making	over	a	
span	 of	 time.	 So	 if	 there	 are	 fair	 and	 free	 elections	 and	 I	 am	 not	 in	 the	
majority	but	 the	majority	are	able	 to	have	 their	way	 in	a	 limited	 span	of	
time,	 a	 year	 or	 tow	 two,	 and	 if	 that	 is	 a	 more	 efficient	 process	 and	
government	is	able	to	achieve	more	just	goals	by	that	means,	then	I	will	be	
willing	to	 forsake	my	having	a	say	over	every	single	policy,	supposing	 just	
ends	weren’t	advanced	as	much.	How	can	the	golden	rule	close	up	that	kind	
of	argument	for	a	majoritarian	conception	of	democracy?		
‐ Wiredu:	No,	the	golden	rule	doesn’t	decide	every	issue.	I	mean	the	golden	
rule	 is	 very	 basis	 for	 a	 lot	 of	 other	 things.	We	 have	 to	 argue,	 let’s	 say,	
permissive	ground	and	so	on.	Moreover,	 I	would	 like	 to	say	 this:	 I	don’t	
take	the	golden	rule	to	be	adequate	to	for	every	human	problem.	With	my	
class,	when	 I	 say,	 “Tthere	 used	 to	 be	 a	 Caribbean	Calypso”	 	 called	 Lord	
Krishna	and	 in	one	of	his	 songs	he	says,	 suppose	 that	you	are	 in	a	boat	
with	your	wife	and	your	mother	and	the	boat	is	about	to	capsize	and	you	
can	only	 save	one,	 either	your	mother	or	your	wife.	Which	one	 are	you	
going	to	save?	And	I	point	out	that	the	golden	rule	does	not	apply	in	a	case	
like	that	and	there	are	similaritiesy	in	other	cases.		
‐ Metz:		Then	do	we	come	to	the	idea	that	promoting	wellbeing	is	next	in	line	
after	the	golden	rule,	or	what	other	principles	do	you	want	to	appeal	when	
the	golden	rule	gives	out?	
‐ Wiredu:	 Iin	the	case	that	you	gave,	there	is	somebody	who	doesn’t	think	
that	 we	 don’t	 get	 the	 full	 details,	 perhaps	 he	 thinks	 that	 it	 is	 not	
practicable		for	every	situation	to	have	your	interest	consulted	and	so	on.	
But	we	can	get	to	the	details	of	the	argument	and	we	see	what	the	basis	is.	
If	 it	 is	on	grounds	 	of	practicality,	 that	could	be	a	reasonable	position.	 If	
that	person	 is	debating	with	somebody	who	demands	that	 in	every	case	
that	 should	 be	 required,	 then	 they	 will	 go	 into	more	 discussion.	 But	 it	
	 12
won’t	 be	 the	 golden	 rule	 or	 any	 similar	 rule,	 it	will	 be	more	practical.	 I	
thin	the	consideration	will	be	more	practical.			
‐ Eze:	Do	you	agree	with	Pauline	Hountondji’s	critique	of	ethnophilosophy?	If	
so,	 why	 would	 you	 agree	 with	 him?	 If	 not,	 can	 you	 give	 us	 a	 general	
perspective	on	what	you	will	describe	as	African	philosophy?		
‐ Wiredu:	 Ok,	 that	 is	 a	 big	 question.	 First	 of	 all,	 let’s	 take	 the	Hountondji	
question.	Hountondji	and	I	agree	on	some	issues	but	not	in	on	every	issue.	
A	lot	of	my	work	will	 fall	under	what	he	calls	“ethnophilosophy”,	that	 is,	
my	 reflections	on	 the	Akan,	what	 the	Akans	 think,	 et	 cetera.	That	 is	 the	
kind	 fo	 of	 thing	 he	 calls	 “ethnophilosophy”.	 So	 there	 is	 a	 disagreement	
there	 between	 me	 and	 Hountondji,	 because	 I	 think	 that	 you	 can	 do	
worthwhile	work	while	studying	the	worldviews	and	also	the	philosophy	
of	 a	 whole	 group	 of	 people,	 especially	 if	 they	 don’t	 have	 a	 written	
tradition.	 I	am	not	aware	of	a	written	 tradition	 in	Ghana	dating	back	 to,	
say,	even	the	17th	Century	or	earlier,	so	that	is	all	right.	However	I	argue	
agree	with	Hountondji	when	he	says	that	philosophy		must	be	critical.	If	I	
identify	something	as	a	view	that	was	held	by	my	own	society	in	time	past	
and	 so	 on,	 that	 doesn’t	 make	 that	 view	 true	 or	 anything.	 I	 have	 to	
evaluate,	I	have	to	examine	the	validity	of	that	view.	Now	that	is	perhaps	
not	exactly	Hountonji’s	tone,	but	it	is	close	to	Hountondji	that	in	the	first	
case.		
‐ 	
‐ Now	when	it	comes	to	what	African	philosophy	is,	in	general,	I	would	say	
that	 African	 philosophy	 is	 the	 investigation	 into	 various	 fundamental	
concepts	 for	 human	 thought.	 I	 believe	 that	 we	 all	 have,	 (apart	 from	
perhaps,	 idiots),	 we	 all	 have	 some	 conceptions	 of	 the	 world	 and	 it	
comprises	a	whole	lot	of	 things.	We	believe	that	we	can	walk	on	earth.	I	
walk	from	here	to	the	door	without	suddenly	collapsing.	I	believe	that	 if	
something	happens	or	something	else	happens,	I	expect	that	there	will	be	
some	causal	connections	and	so	on.	There	are	basic	concepts	that	we	have	
by	 the	 fact	 that	we	 are	human	beings	 that	have	 a	worldview.	But,	 then,	
there	are	issues	that	make	it	protracted	thinking	when	you	start	trying	to	
build	a	 coherent	picture	of	 the	world.	Let	me	 increase	 the	dimension	of	
the	worldviews	a	little	bit.	I	mentioned	the	idea	of	cause	and	effect;,	we	do	
also	 have	 the	 idea	 of	 ourselves	 as	 beings	 that	 can	 take	 decisions	 based	
upon	 some	 rational	 reflections	 just	 at	 pre‐philosophical	 level.	 However,	
when	it	enters	your	head	to	try	to	make	a	coherent	picture	of	 that	 ,	you	
soon	encounter	difficulties.	Like,	okOK,	 if	we	are	beings	 that	have	a	 free	
will	we	can	make	free	decisions	and	so	on.	How	is	 that	compatible	with	
the	fact	that	we	live	in	a	world	of	cause	and	effect	and	so	on?.	These	are	
questions	 raised	 by	 philosophers,	 not	 just	 by	 ordinary	 persons.	 Now,	 I	
find	that	in	my	tradition,	questions	of	this	kind	are	raised.		Even	in	those	
traditions	 where	 we	 don’t	 have	 writings	 or	 written	 records	 of	
philosophers	and	only	oral	traditions,	I	find	that	we	do	raise	questions	of	
that	 kind.	 So	 we	 have	 African	 philosophy	 first	 because	 even	where	 we	
only	have	an	oral	tradition	we	have	people	that	have	raised	questions	of	a	
philosophical	kind	such	as	I	described.	In	some	parts	of	Africa,	we	do	have	
both	an	oral	and	written	tradition.	Ethiopia	is	a	clear	case.	More	recently,	
it	 is	becoming	known	that	 in	other	parts	of	Africa	 like	northern	Nigeria,	
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Senegal	and	East	Africa,	we	had	a	 lot	of	philosophical	work	going	on.	So	
African	philosophy	is	philosophy	done	by	Africans	now	as	well	as	 the	 in	
the	past,	either	through	oral	tradition	or	through	written	tradition.		
‐ Eze:	Aand	you	that	think	that	these	“philosophies”,	if	I	use	it	in	plural	sense,	
that	these	different	worldviews	can	be	harmonized?	Like	in	Igbo	we	have	a	
different	 worldview	 of	 looking	 at	 life,	 the	 Akan	 has	 have	 a	 different	
worldview	of	life,	can	we	then	really	generalize	these	competing	worldviews	
and	say	that	this	is	one	single	homogenous	African	philosophy?	Can	we	say	
that	this	 is	“African	philosophy”	or	“philosophies	 from	Africa”?	The	 former	
homogenizes	and	while	the	latter	allows	for	plurality.		
‐ Wiredu:	Ffirst	of	all,	notice	that	I	make	a	distinction	between	worldviews	
and	philosophy.	You	get	a	philosophy	when	you	investigate	or	you	try	to	
make	a	coherent	picture	from	your	worldview.	Now	as	to	the	question	of	
generalization,	 that	 is	 an	 empirical	 question	 and	 I	 am	 surprised	 how	
similar	people	from	Africa	that	are	far	removed	from	mine.	If	you	talk	of	
groups	that	are	near,	say,	Ghana,	Sierra	Leone	or	Nigeria	and	so	on,	there	
are	 a	 lot	 of	 things	 that	 are	 very	 similar.	 If	 you	 take	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	
human	personality	between	the	Akans	of	Ghana	and	the	Yoruba,	it	always	
fascinates	 me	 how	 similar	 they	 are.	 There	 are	 differences	 of	 detail	 but	
there	are	enough	similaritiesy	to	justify	speaking	about	a	conception	of	a	
person	 that	 is	 common	 between	 Akans	 and	 Yorubas.	 You	 will	 find	 the	
same	thing	with	the	people	in	Sierra	Leone.	Now	you	find	the	same	thing	
though	 with	 a	 slight	 reduction	 of	 similarity	 between	 the	 concept	 of	
persons	we	have	in	West	Africa	and	those	that	we	have	in	Southern	and	
Central	Africa.	Kagame	did	a	study	of	what	he	called	“Bantu”	conceptions	
of	person.	And	it	is	unbelievable	how	similar	the	results	are.	I	have	not??	
read	his	original	book	because	 it	was	written	 in	French,	but	 I	got	a	very	
substantial	summary	from	what	he	was	saying	 in	English	from	a	certain	
journal.	 And	 these	 worldviews	 despite	 degree	 of	 differences	 are	 very	
similar.	So	I	don’t	think	that	it	is	over‐generalizing	to	speak	of	the	African	
conception	 of	 a	 person,	 at	 least	 to	 speak	 of	 certain	 distinct	 part	 of	 that	
conception.	Again,	 Kkagame	did	 a	 very	 similar	 empirical	 study.	Kagame	
actually	 studied	 all	 the	 languages.	 Now	 Kagame	 points	 out	 that	 the	
concept	 of	 existence	 in	 the	 Bantu	 language	 ‐	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 “Bantu”	
language	‐		the		conception	of	existence,	you	always	need	to	have	adverb	
to	play.	To	say	that	something	exists,	you	have	to	say	something	like	ba‐
ho.	And	the	“ho”	is	the	special	adverb.	So	he	says,	suppose	Descartes	were	
to	say,	“I	think	therefore	I	am”	to	a	Bantu,	the	Bantu	would	probably	say,	
you	 are	 what?	 “I	 am”	 doesn’t	 make	 sense	 in	 itself.	 It	 is	 going	 to	 be	
something	 that	will	 locate	you	 in	 the	space.	But	 this	 is	exactly	 the	same	
situation	in	Akan.	In	Akan,	to	exist	is	to	Wo‐ho.	Note		that	the	adverb	“ho”	
is	the	same	in	both	cases	except	that	we	say	“wo”	and	Kagame	says	“Ba”.	
On	 an	 empirical	 basis	 like	 that,	 it	 	 may	 be	 	 possible	 to	 make	
generalizations.	One	cannot	expect	to	make	total	generalizations	over	too	
many	subjects.	But	we	have	a	common	view.	In	general	I	agree	we	ought	
to	 be	 careful	 when	 we	 make	 generalizations	 because	 Africa	 is	 a	 big	
continent	and	important	differences	might	crop	up	as	we	go	along.		
‐ Eze:	You	are		Pprofessor	of	Philosophy	at	South	Florida;	you	are	an	African	
and	you	are	an	Akan.	Now,	when	one	asks	you	a	question	with	regards	to	
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your	 professional	 identity,	would	 it	 be	 that	 of	 a	Western	 philosopher	 or	
would	you	rather	say	 	that	you	are	an	African	philosopher	in	a	Western	or	
Anglo‐American	tradition?		
‐ Wiredu:	You	mean,	would	I	call	myself	an	African	philosopher	in	an	Anglo‐
American	tradition?	What	does	that	mean?		
‐ Eze:	I	am	trying	to	explore	the	possibility	to	the	question	 	whether	you	see	
yourself	primarily	as	an	African	philosopher	or	a	Western	philosopher?	 Is	
there	a	conflict	of	identity?		
‐ Wiredu:	No,	 in	South	Florida	 I	 teach	African	philosophy	but	 I	 also	 teach	
Western	philosophy.	But	 fFor	historical	 reasons,	we	have	come	 into	 the	
ambit	of	Western	philosophy	also.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 to	make	 sense	 for	 an	
African	living	in	a	contemporary	world	to	see	what	they	can	get	from	that	
tradition	into	which	he	was	brought	by	history.		I	think	also	that	it	will	be	
good	 for	 African	 philosophers	 to	 see	 what	 he	 can	 get	 from	 Eastern	
philosophy	 because	 but	 time	 is	 too	 short;	 too	 many	 deadlines	 and	 so	
forth,	 but	 I	 think	 it	 is	 a	 reasonable	 objective	 to	 try	 to	 see	 if	we	 can	 get	
something	 from	Western	or	Eastern	philosophies.	 So	 I	 think	 that	 I	 have	
gotten	 something	 from	Western	 philosophy	 but	 not	 everything.	 I	 think	
that	the	things	that	I	get	from	my	own	traditional	philosophy	enrich	me.		
Also,	when	I	get	something	from	Western	philosophy,	I	grill	it	through	my	
conceptual	framework,	which	is	embedded,	in	my	own	language.	I	think	if	
you	do	 that,	 you	will	 see	 that	 certain	 things	 in	Western	philosophy	 just	
won’t	work.		
	
